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FIRST CIRCUIT
Dickow. v. United States, 654 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) erred in
concluding “that [26 U.S.C.] § 6511(b)(2)(A) and its implementing
regulations bar the requested refund because [petitioner] was not entitled
to a second extension of the filing deadline that determined the estate’s
eligibility for the refund.” Id. at 146.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “the question turns on
interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 6081, governing extensions of time, and the
regulations promulgated by the IRS within its authority under the
Internal Revenue Code.” Id. The court then applied the Chevron
doctrine, and looked to whether Congress specifically addressed the issue
at hand in plain statutory text, and if not, whether any ambiguous
statutory text has been reasonably interpreted by the agency. Id. at 149.
The court noted that it could not disturb an “IRS rule unless it was
arbitrary and capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.” Id. Examining 26 U.S.C. § 6081, the court found that it allows
for extensions of a period of six months, but it does not state whether
more than one extension can be granted. Id. at 150. For clarification, the
court then looked at the IRS regulations, which provide two categories of
estate tax extensions. Id. The first is an automatic six month extensions
upon the timely filing of Form 4678; the second is a six month
extensions for good cause by filing a Form 4678 with a detailed
explanation of why the taxpayer requires an extension. Id. The court
found that these regulations reasonably prevent indefinite extensions. Id.
The court also found that the IRS promulgated the regulations pursuant
to explicit Congressional authorization and pursuant to notice and
comment procedures, a sign that deference should be granted. Id. The
court noted that there was some ambiguity in the rule, but when viewed
as a whole, the rules are clear, especially when the IRS’s own
interpretation is entitled to deference. Id. at 151.
CONCLUSION: The court found that the “IRS did not have the
authority to grant . . . a second six-month extension,” and therefore, “the
refund claim must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Id.
Hernández-Miranda v. Empresas Díaz Massó, Inc., 651 F.3d 167 (1st
Cir. 2011)
QUESTION:
Whether the “current” calendar year, which
determines the damages cap under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) in a Title VII
employment discrimination action, refers to “the calendar year(s) in
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which the discrimination occurred or the calendar year in which the
damage award is made.” Id. at 169.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 4th, 5th, and 7th Circuits
concluded, based on the plain language of the statute, that the “current”
calendar year is the year in which the discrimination occurred. Id. at
171. The court also observed that the Supreme Court, considering other
statutes, has ruled that the “current” calendar year was the year of
discrimination. Id. The court found § 1981a(b)(3), however, to be
ambiguous. Id. at 171–72. The court then looked to the larger statutory
scheme of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) and concluded that Congress
intended to protect “small employers at the time of the discrimination,
and not those who by happenstance or design became smaller employers
between the time of discrimination and the time of the verdict.” Id. at
173. The court further reasoned that construction of the statute to mean
the year of discrimination would best serve “Title VII’s purpose of
encouraging resolution of disputes before litigation commences.” Id.
The court also found support for this interpretation in judicial
constructions of another Title VII provision, which employs the phrase
“current” calendar year as well. Id. at 174.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that the “current” calendar year
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) refers to the calendar year in which the
discrimination occurred. Id. at 170.
Ramos-Cruz v. Centro Medico Del Turabo, 642 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a hospital violates the “appropriate pretransfer treatment” provision of the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”) if that “hospital does not deliver the
feasible specific treatment that is best.” Id. at 19.
ANALYSIS: The court, in affirming the district court’s holding,
relied on 10th Circuit precedent regarding appropriate pre-transfer
treatment, which held that “a hospital runs afoul of this provision only
where it violates an existing hospital procedure or requirement.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The court noted that its
jurisprudence interpreted similar provisions of EMTALA in the same
way, where “inappropriate” means only a refusal to follow regular
procedures, not faulty treatment in one instance. Id. The court also
stated that a contrary rule “would create a federal malpractice cause of
action,” which would be “entirely inconsistent with [its] jurisprudence
and Congressional intent . . . .” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that a hospital does not violate
the appropriate pre-transfer provision of EMTALA if that hospital does
not deliver the best feasible treatment. Id.
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Ramos-Martinez v. United States, 638 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “the limitations period for the filing of a
federal prisoner’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) [is] subject
to equitable tolling.” Id. at 318.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the factors articulated in Holland
v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560–62 (2010), are appropriate in this case
to determine whether the limitations period contained in § 2255(f) of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) is
subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 321. First, the court found that
§ 2255(f) is non-jurisdictional and stated that “[w]hen found in federal
statutes, non-jurisdictional limitations periods ordinarily are subject to a
rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling is available.” Id. Next, the
court stated that § 2255(f) does not contain unusually emphatic language
that might rebut the presumption of equitable tolling. Id. at 322. Finally,
the court reasoned that “allowing equitable tolling in appropriate
circumstances would not undercut the AEDPA’s core principles.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held “that section 2255(f)’s one-year
limitations period is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate instances.”
Id.
Roman-Oliveras v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43 (1st
Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) provides for liability against individuals who are not employers.
Id. at 45.
ANALYSIS: The court first recognized that, while neither the 1st
Circuit nor the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected individual liability
under Title I, numerous circuit courts have taken that position. Id. at 50–
51. The court reiterated the compelling assertion that the ADA should
not support personal capacity claims because the 1st Circuit has held that
Title VII, an analogous statute, also does not support personal capacity
claims. Id. at 51. The court favorably quoted from previous 1st Circuit
precedent in which they adopted the 9th Circuit’s observation that “[i]f
Congress decided to protect small entities with limited resources from
[Title VII] liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow
civil liability to run against individual employees.” Id. Lastly, the court
mentioned that the 1991 amendments to Title VII’s remedial scheme,
applicable to the ADA as well, failed to state the amount of damages, if
any, that would be payable by individuals. Id. The court interpreted
Congressional silence on an individual damage provision to mean that
Congress did not contemplate including individual liability under the
terms of Title VII or Title I of the ADA. Id. at 52.
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CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that Title I of the ADA imposes
liability on employers only, and not on individual co-workers. Id.
SECOND CIRCUIT
Abrahams v. MTA Long Island Bus, 644 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION ONE: Whether a “private right of action exists to
enforce 49 C.F.R. § 37.137(c), the [Department of Transportation’s]
ongoing public participation regulation,” promulgated pursuant to
§ 12143 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id. at 115–16.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the Supreme Court has
determined that “private rights of action to enforce federal law must be
created by Congress and the statute in question must evidence
congressional intent to create a private right of action.” Id. at 117
(internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, where Congress
creates a private right of action in a statute, that right does not
automatically extend to the statute’s implementing regulations. Id. at
117–18. The court noted that a private right of action exists only where
the right originates in the underlying statute and only to the regulations
necessary to apply the statute’s mandates. Id. at 118. Observing that the
ADA broadly bars discrimination, the court concluded that Congress
intended to create a private right of action. Id. However, because the
ongoing public participation regulation goes beyond the ADA’s statutory
mandate, the court found that no private right of action existed to enforce
that regulation. Id. at 119–20.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that no private right of action
exists to enforce 49 C.F.R. § 37.137(c) because the provision goes
beyond merely applying the ADA’s public participation mandate. Id.
QUESTION TWO: Whether the ADA obligates a public entity
providing paratransit services to make reasonable modifications to its
“additional services.” Id. at 120.
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the Attorney General has the
authority to issue regulations implementing the provisions of Part A of
Title II of the ADA, and that the Secretary of Transportation has the
authority to issue regulations implementing the paratransit and
“additional services” provisions in Part B of Title II of the ADA. Id.
Although the Attorney General has required public entities to make
reasonable modifications that are necessary to avoid discrimination on
the basis of disability, the court observed that the Secretary of
Transportation has not promulgated a regulation requiring public entities
to make reasonable modifications to their “additional services” to avoid
discriminating against disabled individuals. Id. The court explained
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that the Attorney General’s regulation did not apply to any matter
“within the scope of authority of the Secretary of Transportation,” and
therefore, the reasonable modification requirement does not cover
“additional services” of public entities providing paratransit services. Id.
at 121.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the ADA does not obligate
a public entity providing paratransit services to make reasonable
modifications to its “additional services.” Id. at 120–21.
City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.
2011)
QUESTION: Whether “a defendant who repeatedly moves to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but then withdraws from the
litigation after those motions are denied, is permitted to attack an ensuing
default judgment on the grounds that it is void for lack of personal
jurisdiction.” Id. at 118.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “personal jurisdiction, unlike
subject-matter jurisdiction, can . . . be purposely waived or inadvertently
forfeited.” Id. at 133. The court then noted that whether waiver or
forfeiture of the personal jurisdiction defense had occurred would be
determined by taking into account “all of the relevant circumstances.”
Id. The court then analyzed the relevant circumstances, emphasizing that
the defendant had willfully withdrawn from the litigation despite being
warned that a default judgment would result. Id. at 135. Finally, the
court opined that it saw “no reason to require the district court to raise
sua sponte the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction on behalf of
parties who have elect[ed] not to pursue those defenses for
[themselves].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that a defendant forfeits its
jurisdictional defense if it appears before a district court to press that
defense but then willfully withdraws from litigation and defaults, even
after being warned of the consequences of doing so.” Id.
Delgado v. Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) bars a district court
from adjudicating indirect challenges to an order of removal. Id. at 53.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5),
establishing a petition for review to the court of appeals as the sole
means for judicial review of an order of removal, clearly precludes
district courts from entertaining direct challenges to removal orders. Id.
at 55. The court then found the plaintiff’s mandamus action, seeking
adjudication on the merits of an I-212 waiver application, was an indirect
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challenge to a removal order. Id. Although not directly affecting the
removal order, the court stated that, because a grant of an I-212 waiver
would render the removal order invalid, the petitioner’s mandamus suit is
precluded. Id. The court found it irrelevant whether the challenged
order was reinstated by Immigration and Customs Enforcement or the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. Id. at 55–56.
Finally, the court observed federal question jurisdiction cannot exist
under the Administrative Procedure Act where “statutes preclude judicial
review.” Id. at 56.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that a district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over an indirect challenge to an order of
removal. Id. at 53.
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 651 F.3d 329
(2d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “11 U.S.C. [(Title 11)] § 546(e), which
shields settlement payments from avoidance actions in bankruptcy,
extends to an issuer’s payments to redeem its commercial paper prior to
maturity.” Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS: The court first reasoned that the defendant gave no
evidence why its payments should fall outside the definition of
“settlement payment” as mandated under § 741(8) of Title 11. Id. at 335.
The court next determined the defendant’s “redemption payments fall
within the plain language of § 741(8) and are protected from avoidance
under § 546(e).” Id. The court noted that the meaning of § 741(8) could
be gathered through the principles of statutory construction, reasoning
that “the phrase ‘commonly used in the securities industry’ thus is
properly read as modifying only the term ‘any other similar payment.’”
Id. at 335–336. The court explained that the phrase was “not a limitation
on the definition of settlement payment, but rather . . . a catchall phrase
intended to underscore the breadth of the § 546(e) exemption.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court further explained that
“nothing in the text of § 741(8) or in any other provision of the
Bankruptcy Code supports a purchase or sale requirement.” Id. at 336.
Finally, the court found that “concluding that the safe harbor protects
payments made to redeem tradeable debt securities does not contradict
case law permitting avoidance of payments made on ordinary loans.” Id.
at 337. The court further stated that “[i]nterpreting the term ‘settlement
payment’ in the context of the securities industry will exclude from the
safe harbor payments made on ordinary loans.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that because there is no such
requirement needed to exclude from the safe harbor repayment of
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ordinary loans, there is no purchase or sale requirement imposed on §
741(8) of Title 11. Id. at 338.
M.F. v. State of N. Y. Exec. Dep’t Div. of Parole, 640 F.3d 491 (2d Cir.
2011)
QUESTION: Whether “the [Interstate Compact for Adult Offender
Supervision (“the Compact”)] or its authorizing statute creates a private
right of action.” Id. at 494.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[f]ederal statutes can create
causes of action expressly or impliedly,” and that since “neither the
Compact nor the federal statute that authorizes it contains an express
private right of action, [it] must determine whether such a right is
implicit in them.” Id. at 495. The court focused its analysis on
congressional intent to create a private right of action by looking to the
text and structure of the statute. Id. The court found that “the Compact’s
text and structure make it clear that it is solely an agreement between
states, and not a source of private rights of action for the offenders whose
interstate movement it governs.“ The court went on to consider the four
factors of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), “in order to illuminate [its]
analysis of congressional intent.” Id. at 495–96. The court found that all
four factors “militate against finding an implied private right of action in
this case.” Id. at 496. Finally, the court reasoned that the federal statute
that authorizes the Compact, “does nothing more than authorize states (1)
to enter into agreements and compacts with each other for purposes of
crime prevention, and (2) to establish agencies to oversee those interstate
agreements and compacts.” Id. at 496–97. Thus, the court found no
Congressional intent in the authorizing statute to create a private right of
action. Id. at 497.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that the Compact and its
authorizing statute create neither an express nor an implied federal
private right of action.” Id.
MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268 (2d Cir.
2011)
QUESTION: Whether section 107 of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), which provides that “no person may
rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the
purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation” of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), bars “all civil RICO
claims predicated upon securities fraud,” or if there is an exception for
claims where no private right of action under securities law exists. Id. at
273–74.
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[t]he district court judges in [the
2nd Circuit] that have addressed [this question] are divided.” Id. at 273.
The court stated that “the plain language of [section 107 of the PSLRA]
does not require that the same plaintiff who sues under RICO must be the
one who can sue under securities law” and “does not indicate that
Congress intended that it be applied in [such a] limited manner.” Id. at
277–78 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court explained that
“Congress intended that the section would eliminate securities fraud as a
predicate offense in a civil RICO action,” and not merely remove
actionable claims under securities law. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court reasoned that if there was an exception for nonactionable securities fraud claims, “a plaintiff could too easily
manipulate a complaint to skirt [section 107 of the PSLRA’s]
limitations.” Id. at 275. Finally, the court noted that its holding was in
agreement with similar decisions of the 3rd, 5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits
since “those cases, like the plaintiff here, without recourse to a private
cause of action under the securities laws, . . . concluded that the
plaintiffs’ RICO claims were barred by the [PSLRA].” Id. at 280.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that section 107 of the
PSLRA bars civil RICO claims alleging predicate acts of securities
fraud, even where a plaintiff cannot itself pursue a securities fraud action
against the defendant.” Id. at 277.
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. De La Republica Arg., 652 F.3d 172
(2d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION ONE: Whether “the exercise of sovereign immunity for
‘property . . . of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its
own account’ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) depend[s] on whether
the central bank or monetary authority is entitled to a presumption of
independence . . . .” Id. at 175 (internal citations omitted).
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “unless the property of a
foreign state, as defined in § 1603(a), is subject to one of the exceptions
set forth in [the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)] § 1610, it is
immune from attachment, arrest, and execution pursuant to FSIA
§ 1609.” Id. at 186–87. The court further explained that under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1611(b)(i) “the property of a foreign state shall be immune from
attachment and from execution, if . . . the property is that of a foreign
central bank or monetary authority held for its own account.” Id. at 187.
The court reasoned that “the plain language of the statute suggests that
Congress recognized that the property of a central bank, immune under
§ 1611, might also be the property of that central bank’s parent state.”
Id. at 188. Further, the court noted that if congress intended to limit the
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statute to independent central banks, the statute would have been
constructed differently. Id. “Therefore, the statute seems to anticipate
the possibility that property held by the central bank may also be
property of the sovereign state.” Id. at 188–89. To bolster this
reasoning, the court noted that “if execution could be levied on such
funds without an explicit waiver, deposit of foreign funds in the United
States might be discouraged,” thus complicating foreign relations. Id. at
189. The court adds that “it makes no sense to assume that Congress
would enact a statute designed to prevent significant foreign relations
problems which failed to immunize a significant portion of the central
bank reserves in the United States.” Id. at 191. The court further
reasoned that “there is no indication in the text, history, or structure of
the FSIA that Congress intended to make the immunity of a central
bank’s property contingent on the independence of the central bank. The
statute makes no reference to the independence or autonomy of a central
bank or monetary authority. Moreover, the history of the FSIA and of
the independence of central banks suggests that Congress understood the
property of a foreign central bank to be deserving of immunity regardless
of that bank’s independence.” Id. at 190.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that the plain language,
history, and structure of § 1611(b)(1) immunizes property of a foreign
central bank or monetary authority held for its own account without
regard to whether the bank or authority is independent from its parent
state.” Id. at 187–88.
QUESTION TWO: What “the proper meaning of the phrase
‘property . . . of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its
own account’ [is under] § 1611(b)(1).” Id. at 175 (internal citations
omitted).
ANALYSIS: The court first established that “property is ‘held for its
own account’ if that property is used for ‘traditional central banking
activities.’” Id. at 191 (internal citations omitted). The court stated that
“this appears to be the test adopted by Congress in the FSIA.” Id. The
rationale came from House Report 31, stating: “Funds held for the
bank’s or authority’s ‘own account’ . . . [include] funds used or held in
connection with central banking activities, as distinguished from funds
used solely to finance the commercial transactions of other entities or of
foreign states”. Id. The court further offered that “funds are considered
to be ‘held for a central bank’s own account’ if they are used to perform
functions that are normally understood to be the functions of a nation’s
central bank, and are not utilized in commercial activities.” Id. The
court supposed that an alternate definition of central bank property “held
for its own account” could be drawn from the common law of bank
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deposits. Id. at 191–92. Here, the court stated, property of a central
bank is “held for its own account” if it is in an account in the central
bank’s name because under “fundamental banking law principles, a
positive balance in a bank account reflects a debt from the bank to the
depositor and no one else.” Id. at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court determined that a modified test—“which combines the ‘plain
language’ of the statute and ‘central bank activities’ tests as conjunctive
requirements—accords with the text and purpose of §1611(b)(1) . . . .”
Id. at 194. The court adopted this test for purposes of determining
whether central bank property is “held for its own account.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “where funds are held in
an account in the name of a central bank or monetary authority, the funds
are presumed to be immune from attachment under § 1611(b)(1).” Id.
United States v. Gravel, 645 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether any weapon which “is designed to shoot . . .
automatically more than one shot,” under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) includes a
weapon that was originally designed to shoot automatically but was redesigned to shoot semi-automatically. Id. at 551 (alteration in original).
ANALYSIS: After determining that the word “designed” was not
defined in the statute, the court examined Webster’s Third International
Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary. Id. The court noted that
“design” was defined as “to form plan or scheme of, conceive and
arrange in mind, originate mentally, plan out, [or] contrive” and found
“design” under the statute to mean what was contemplated when the
weapon was originally conceived and devised. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)
includes a weapon that was originally designed to shoot automatically
but was redesigned to shoot semi-automatically. Id. at 551–52.
United States v. Qurashi, 634 F.3d 699 (2d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
(“MVRA”), “a criminal restitution order may include prejudgment
interest.” Id. at 702.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the primary goal of the
MVRA is to make victims of crime whole by fully compensating them
for their losses and returning them to their original state of well-being.
Id. at 703. The court reasoned that “if sentencing courts are required to
compensate victims for the full amount of each victim’s losses, there is
no reason to exclude losses that result from the deprivation of the
victim’s ability to put its money to productive use.” Id. (internal
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quotation marks omitted). In addition, the court noted that the MVRA’s
primary goal of “compensating victims for their losses is advanced by
allowing prejudgment interest.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the MVRA allows a
sentencing court to award prejudgment interest in a criminal restitution
order to ensure compensation in the full amount of each victim’s losses.”
Id. at 704 (internal quotation marks omitted).
United States v. Simels, 654 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether unlawfully obtained wiretap evidence may be
used by the prosecution for impeachment in a criminal case. Id. at 169.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “all of the circuits that have
considered the issue have held that unlawfully obtained wiretap evidence
may be used by the prosecution for impeachment in a criminal case.” Id.
These circuits have extended the rationale used in Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), a case in which the Supreme Court used
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment for
impeachment purposes in violation of Title III. Id. The court reasoned
that if evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution was admissible,
evidence in violation of a statute could be used for impeachment
purposes. Id. at 170. The court added that “Congress had this
background in mind when the statute was passed, and that, in the absence
of an express statement, it did not intend to draw the line of exclusion in
a different place.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that evidence that was
obtained unlawfully under Title III may be used by the prosecution for
impeachment in a criminal case. Id.
THIRD CIRCUIT
Helen Mining Co. v. Dir. OWCP, 650 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a prior denial of benefits under the Black
Lung Benefit Act for a medical disability due to pneumoconiosis triggers
the three-year statute of limitations as to bar any subsequent claims of
eligibility. Id. at 251.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the phrase “medical
determination of total disability due to pneumoconiosis” was not defined
by the statute or the regulation. Id. The court reasoned that the
“remedial nature of the statute requires a liberal construction of the Black
Lung entitlement program to ensure widespread benefits to miners.” Id.
at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court further explained
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that because pneumoconiosis was a latent and progressive disease, the
statute should be read “in an expansive manner to ensure that any miner
who has been afflicted with the disease, including its progressive form, is
given every opportunity to prove he is entitled to benefits.” Id. at 253.
Finally, the court opined that an expansive reading of the statute of
limitations provision would be “consistent with, both, a legislative intent
to favor miners and the regulatory provision that allows subsequent
claims.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a medical determination of total
disability due to pneumoconiosis predating a prior and final denial of
benefits is deemed a misdiagnosis, and thus, cannot trigger the statute of
limitations for filing a subsequent claim.” Id. at 251.
In re Marcal Paper Mills, Inc., 650 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “[W]hether under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act (MPPAA), the portion of withdrawal liability that is
attributable to the post-petition time period constitutes an administrative
expense entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 312.
ANALYSIS: The court first established that, in bankruptcy
proceedings, administrative expenses are entitled to priority over general
unsecured creditors’ claims. Id. at 313. The court then explained that
administrative expenses “must arise from a [post-petition] transaction
with the debtor-in-possession, . . . must be beneficial to the debtor-inpossession in the operation of the business[,] . . . and must also be actual
and necessary” to the bankrupt company’s continued operation. Id. at
314–15. The court observed that a bankrupt company’s pension benefits
are part of the consideration it gives its employees for performing such
necessary, post-petition work. Id. at 315. The court also observed that
Congress enacted the MPPAA to preserve this liability even after the
company withdraws from a multiemployer plan. Id. at 316.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that withdrawal liability arising
from post-petition work is an administrative expense entitled to priority.
Id. at 314.
J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d. Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a School District violated a student’s First
Amendment right to free speech when it disciplined the student for
creating, on a weekend on her home computer, a MySpace profile
making fun of her high school principal. Id. at 920.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[t]he Supreme Court
established a basic framework for assessing student free speech claims in
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Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).”
Id. at 926. The court then stated that it would “assume, without deciding,
that Tinker applies to [the plaintiff’s] speech in this case.” Id. The
Supreme Court in Tinker held that school officials are justified in
prohibiting speech if they can demonstrate “facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption
of or material interference with school activities.” Id. at 928. In
reviewing the record, the court noted that the speech “was so outrageous
that no one could have taken it seriously.” Id. at 930. The court then
noted that the student “did not even intend for the speech to reach the
school.” Id. Further, the court noted that the speech, which “contained
adult language and sexually explicit content” making fun of a school
official, did not identify the school official by name, school, or location
and was not accessible at school. Id. at 929. The court then compared
the court’s record to the record in Tinker and determined that “[t]he facts
simply do not support the conclusion that the School District could have
reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference
with the school as a result of [the plaintiff’s speech].” Id. at 931.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “the School District
violated [the student’s] First Amendment free speech rights when it
suspended her for [the off-campus speech].” Id.
Sarango v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 651 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether an immigration judge has jurisdiction to
consider a “request for consent to reapply for admission” to the United
States after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii). Id. at 381.
ANALYSIS: As and initial mater, the court found that the plain
language of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) unambiguously limits the power
to review requests for consent to reapply for admission to the Secretary
of Homeland Security. Id. at 385–86. The court noted that Congress
enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) to replace a provision which
previously gave the Attorney General the authority to consider requests
for consent. Id. at 385. The court concluded that Congress intended to
divest the Attorney General, as well as the Board of Immigration
appeals and the immigration courts which operate under the Attorney
General, of the authority to consider requests for consent to reapply. Id.
Finally, the court noted that the Board of Immigration Appeals has
previously recognized that Congress can limit the jurisdiction of
immigration agencies. Id. at 386.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that an immigration judge lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate requests for consent to reapply under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(9)(C)(ii). Id. at 387.
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FOURTH CIRCUIT
Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: What is the meaning of the word “earned” under 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code in the context of an
employee’s entitlement to severance pay? Id. at 408.
ANALYSIS: After concluding that the statute does not define the
word “earned,” the court cited two alternative definitions of the term in
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary: to “receive as equitable
return for work done or services rendered,” or “to come to be duly
worthy or entitled.” Id. at 408. Although the first definition may be
more common, the court noted, the second definition is more appropriate
here as it reflects the purpose of severance pay to compensate the
employee “for certain losses attributable to the dismissal.” Id. at 408–09.
Further, because it is termination, and not work or services that
“triggers” severance pay, the court found the first definition to be
inadequate. Id. at 409.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that the word “earned”
interpreted under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) means “to become entitled.” Id.
at 409.
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Black v. Pan Am. Labs., L.L.C., 646 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b), Title VII’s
compensatory and punitive damages cap applies on a “per claim” or a
“per party” basis. Id. at 264.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that while “[t]his issue is one of
first impression in the Fifth Circuit[,]” several other circuits have
addressed it. Id. The court then cited to the 6th Circuit, which “held that
the plain language of the statute dictated applying the cap on a ‘per
party’ basis.” Id. The court added that all of the other circuits that have
addressed this issue “have uniformly held that Title VII’s damages cap
applies to each party in an action, not to each claim.” Id. The court
found the reasoning of its sister circuits compelling and determined that
the plain meaning of the statute dictates application of the cap on a “per
party basis.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “the plain language of [42
U.S.C.] § 1981a(b)’s cap applies to each party in an action.” Id.
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Carder v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 636 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), “provides a service member
with a cause of action against his employer for a hostile work
environment.” Id. at 174.
ANALYSIS: Based on the plain language of USERRA, the court
found that USERRA is meant “to prohibit discrimination and acts of
reprisal against service members because of their service.” Id. at 176.
Based on the statute’s legislative history, the court observed that
Congress intended courts to “broadly construe” USERRA in favor of
service members. Id. The court noted, however, that Congress chose not
to include the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
which, in Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes, give rise to a
cause of action for hostile work environment. Id. at 178.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “based on the distinct text
of USERRA, its legislative history, and its policies and purposes” there
is no cause of action for hostile work environment under USERRA. Id.
at 179.
Martinez v. Caldwell, 644 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a detainee’s pretrial petition for federal habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which does not specify a standard of
review, should be reviewed “with the same deference that [the court]
give[s] habeas corpus petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,” which are
reviewed with the presumption “that a state court correctly determined
questions of fact,” and are deferred to unless based on an unreasonable
determination of facts. Id. at 241–42.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 1st, 9th, and 10th Circuits
“have all held that § 2254(d) deference never applies to habeas petitions
brought by pretrial detainees under § 2241.” Id. at 242. The court
agreed with the other circuits’ holdings, explaining that the deferential
standard, “which is specifically articulated in § 2254, is not included in
the text of § 2241.” Id. As further proof, the court noted that “when
Congress amended § 2254(d) in 1996 amid sweeping habeas reform, it
did not similarly amend § 2241.” Id. The court viewed this as strong
support for de novo review of § 2241 petitions since “it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another.”
Id. The court explained that “[t]he plain language of the statutes clearly
demonstrates that § 2254 is textually distinct from § 2241: one explicitly
mandates deference, the other does not.” Id.
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CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that a pretrial detainee’s
petition for federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 should be
reviewed under a de novo standard, not with the deferential standard
afforded to state court decisions under § 2254. Id.
NLRB. v. PDK Investments, L.L.C., 433 Fed. App’x 297 (5th Cir.
2011)
QUESTION: Whether a union can satisfy its burden of proof by
relying on hearsay as objective evidence to support a reasonable belief
that an employer has breached its duty to bargain in good faith. Id. at
300.
ANALYSIS: The court began by stating that, “the duty to bargain
collectively includes the duty to provide information needed by the
bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “That duty unquestionably extends
beyond the period of contract negotiations and applies to labormanagement relations during the term of an agreement.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court explained that a “[r]efusal to
furnish information to a bargaining representative may constitute a
breach of the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court identified the key inquiry as
whether the information the union seeks is relevant to its duties. Id. The
court stated that a union can satisfy its burden of showing a legitimate
union purpose “only by demonstrating a reasonable belief supported by
objective evidence for requesting the information.” Id. at 301 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that “allowing hearsay at
the information-request stage in the complaint process is consistent with
the liberal, discovery-type standard for information requests that the
Supreme Court has adopted.” Id. at 302.
CONCLUSION: A union may use hearsay as evidence to show the
“reasonableness of the union’s belief that a violation occurred . . . .” Id.
United States v. Bacon, 646 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “a sentencing court can consider remote-intime occurrences to establish a ‘pattern of activity’ under § 2G2.2 [of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines].” Id. at 220.
ANALYSIS: Concurring with rulings of six other circuit courts, the
court stated that a “district court may consider all ‘relevant conduct’
when fashioning a sentence.” Id. at 221. The court noted that the
Guidelines commentary specifically allows courts to consider “conduct
not occurring during the course of the offense of conviction,” so
“relevant conduct” is intended to be broadly construed. Id. The court
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concluded that considering remote-in-time conduct does not violate due
process because it has a rational basis and is not subject to arbitrary
application. Id. at 221–22.
CONCLUSION: The Fifth Circuit held that “remote-in-time conduct
is relevant to § 2G2.2’s ‘pattern of activity’ enhancement.” Id. at 222.
United States v. Block, 635 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether, under 18 U.S.C. § 2251A(a), “custody or
control” over a child depicted in child pornography includes temporary
custody. Id. at 723.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the plain language of the
statute includes “temporary supervision.” Id. at 724. Responding to the
argument that “custody or control” is coextensive with the permanent
custody or control of a parent, the court agreed with the 11th Circuit in
finding that such a reading would render this language meaningless. Id.
The court reasoned that, because the statute “refers to a ‘parent, legal
guardian, or other person having custody or control[,] . . .’ the reference
to custody or control describes the ‘other person,’ not the parent or legal
guardian.” Id. Such other people, the court stated, necessarily refers to
people who exercise parental rights, though without a permanent
character, such as the proprietor of a day care center. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251A(a), “custody or control” of a child includes temporary custody.
Id. at 723–24.
United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “Whether the protections contained in the Second
Amendment extend to aliens illegally present in [the United States].” Id.
at 439
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the Supreme Court in District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) held that the Second
Amendment extends to law-abiding responsible citizens, members of the
political community, and to all Americans. Id. Because “[i]llegal aliens
are not law-abiding, responsible citizens or members of the political
community . . . [and] are not Americans as that word is commonly
understood,” the court reasoned that the language used in Heller
“invalidates [the defendant’s] attempt to extend the protections of the
Second Amendment to illegal aliens.” Id. The court also noted,
however, that in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990), the Supreme Court concluded that the First, Second, and Fourth
Amendments protect “a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connections with
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this country to be considered part of that community.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). Lastly, the court noted that Supreme Court
precedent has “made clear that the Constitution does not prohibit
Congress from making laws that distinguish between citizens and aliens
and between lawful and illegal aliens.” Id. at 442.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “[w]hatever else the term
means or includes, the phrase ‘the people’ in the Second Amendment of
the Constitution does not include aliens illegally in the United States.”
Id.
SIXTH CIRCUIT
Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity
for her false and misleading statements to a trial court in the course of
criminal proceedings about the availability of a witness.” Id. at 403.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that other circuits have held that
“prosecutors are ordinarily entitled to absolute immunity for conduct
falling within a prosecutorial function.” Id. The court reasoned that “a
prosecutor’s statements to the court regarding the availability of
witnesses are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process . . . and are connected with the initiation and conduct of a
prosecution.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Next, the court
stated that “conduct related to the preparation and presentation of witness
testimony may be protected whether it occurs in or out of court.” Id. at
405. Finally, the court stated that a prosecutor’s improper motive alone
will not defeat absolute immunity, provided that the prosecutor’s actions
fall within the scope of his duties as an advocate. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a prosecutor’s statements
to a trial court about the availability of a witness fall within the
prosecutor’s role as an advocate and as such are entitled to absolute
immunity. Id.
Hachem v. Holder, 656 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), terminating a grant of
voluntary departure, and promulgated by the Attorney General, is a valid
regulation. Id. at 438.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the “unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress controls” where “Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue.” Id. The court noted that “Congress has . . .
unambiguously stated that the Attorney General may promulgate
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regulations to limit the eligibility for voluntary departure.” Id. The court
further found that, here, “the Attorney General has promulgated a
regulation under a permissible construction of the statute.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i),
promulgated by the Attorney General, is a valid regulation. Id. at 438–
39.
Jones v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 438 Fed. Appx. 388 (6th Cir. 2011).
QUESTION: Whether McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co.,
513 U.S. 352 (1995), applies to an employee’s wrongdoing that did not
occur until after some sort of adverse action was already taken by the
employer against the plaintiff employee.” Id. 406.
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that the 8th and 10th
Circuits, as well as a number of District Courts, have acknowledged the
possibility that McKennon may impose limitations on an employee’s
remedies for wrongful discharge “but counsel against applying it to limit
recovery where the misconduct can be attributable to the defendant’s
prior illegal action . . . .” Id. at 407. The court also cited several District
Court cases that refused to apply McKennon because of a lack of an
employment relationship. Id. at 406. However, the court found these
cases unpersuasive because the Plaintiff in the present case, while on
medical leave, was still technically an employee at the time. Id. at 407.
The 6th Circuit opined that, had the employeR not wrongfully imposed
medical restrictions rendering the employee unfit to work, the employee
would not have had to seek work without the employer’s permission, and
in violation of its rules. Id.
CONCLUSION: Accordingly, the 6th Circuit held that McKennon’s
rule would not apply when an adverse action has been taken by an
employer against the plaintiff employee and their employment
relationship has not yet been terminated. Id.
United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether solicitation of aggravated assault qualifies as
a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) of the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA). Id. at 730.
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the crime of aggravated assault
involves the use or threat of force, and therefore, qualifies as a violent
felony for ACCA purposes. Id. To determine whether a defendant was
convicted of a violent felony, the court considered only the statutory
elements of the offense to which the defendant actually pleaded. Id. The
court found that the statutory definition of solicitation to commit
aggravated assault does not require as an element “the use, attempted
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use, or threatened use” of force, but rather, the “command, request or
hire” of another to employ such force. Id. at 731.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “[b]ecause the crime of
solicitation to commit aggravated assault is at least one step removed
from the requisite level of force contemplated in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) of the
ACCA, it does not qualify as a ‘violent felony.’” Id.
Williamson v. NLRB, 643 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the gathering and reporting of information by
an employee is a protected activity under § 8(b)(1)(B) of the National
Labor Relations Act. Id. at 487.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit first detailed the history of the
interpretation of § 8(b)(1)(B), noting that the section had been expanded
greatly between the years 1968 and 1974 to include discipline of
management representatives. Id. at 488. The court noted however, that
“[i]n 1974, the Supreme Court rejected the [National Labor Relations
Board’s (NLRB)] expansive view of § 8(b)(1)(B), holding that the
section did not prohibit a union from disciplining its supervisor-members
for their ‘performance of rank-and-file work,’ even though that work was
done in the employer’s interest.” Id. (citation omitted). The court stated
that “[t]he language of § 8(b)(1)(B) protects only the activities of
collective bargaining and grievance adjustment, . . . and the Supreme
Court added ‘some other closely related activity’ in the course of
narrowing interpretation of the section.” Id. (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). The court explained that negotiations between
a particular union and an employer, which the Supreme Court had found
protected under § 8(b)(1)(B), were qualitatively different from the act of
gathering information from multiple unions and reporting back to a
single employer. Id. at 489.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held “the [NLRB] had a rational
basis to conclude that information-gathering is qualitatively different
from the activities § 8(b)(1)(B) protects . . . .” Id. at 490.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Phillips, 645 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a defendant who pleads guilty without raising
an as-applied vagueness challenge in the trial court waives his right to
raise that issue on appeal. Id. at 862.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated a general rule that “a defendant
who pleads guilty waives his right to appeal all non-jurisdictional
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issues.” Id. The court then found that an as-applied challenge is a nonjurisdictional issue because it does not dispute the court’s authority to
hale the defendant into court. Id. at 863. The court then reasoned that a
defendant who pleads guilty affirms as true the underlying facts and
cannot re-argue these facts on appeal in a vague as-applied challenge. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “a defendant who pleads
guilty without raising an as-applied vagueness challenge in the trial court
is barred from raising that issue on appeal.” Id. at 862.
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Dakota, Minn. & Eastern R.R. Corp. v. Schieffer, 648 F.3d 935 (8th
Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether an individually negotiated contract between
an employer and a single employee may be classified as a plan covered
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Id. at 938.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the use of “plan” in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1) “strongly impl[ies] benefits that an employer provides to a
class of employees.” Id. The court further noted that “the plain language
of this statute . . . reflects the congressional intent that a covered plan is
one that provides welfare benefits to more than one person.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). The court next analyzed the relationship between
ERISA and state law, finding that “Congress has never preempted state
laws that regulate and enforce individual employment contracts between
employers and their executives.” Id. Finally, the court noted that
“[n]either the administrative nor the remedial purposes of ERISA
preemption apply to the resolution of contractual disputes between an
employer and a single, salaried employee.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that “an individual contract
providing severance benefits to a single executive employee is not an
ERISA employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1).” Id.
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n. Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc., 651
F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “Whether, under [49 U.S.C.] § 14103(a), the shipper or
receiver reimbursing a trucker’s lumping fees must be the same shipper
or receiver who originally required the lumping.” Id. at 862.
ANALYSIS: The court first found the plain language of § 14103(a)
to be ambiguous. Id. It next turned to the legislative history, and stated
that § 14103(a) is part of the Motor Carrier Act, an Act aimed primarily
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at deregulating shipping activities such as lumping. Id. at 863. The court
explained that the legislative history behind § 14103(a) was to “curtail
coercive and extortionate lumping practices by inducing shippers,
receivers, and truckers to freely negotiate lumping among themselves in
pre-delivery contract.” Id. at 866. The court further noted that Congress
did not impose a specific duty on any party to bear the cost of lumping
fees. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that “the shipper or receiver
who required the lumping must either provide the lumping or pay for it,
and added that a plaintiff trucker suing under § 14103(a) “must show as
part of his prima facie case that he has not been reimbursed by either the
shipper or the receiver.” Id. at 863.
United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “an uncounseled conviction resulting in a
tribal incarceration that involved no actual constitutional violation may
be used later in federal court,” for the purposes of sentencing
enhancement. Id. at 603.
ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit placed substantial weight on the fact
that the defendant’s prior convictions did not involve any actual
constitutional violation. Id. at 603–04. The court also stated that the
technical validity of a conviction should be given greater weight than
whether or not a violation of defendant’s constitutional rights would have
occurred (i.e. the 6th amendment right to counsel) in a non-tribal court.
Id. The court found that “[p]recluding the use of an uncounseled tribal
conviction in federal court would in no manner restrict a tribe’s own use
of that conviction; it would simply restrict a federal court’s ability to
impose additional punishment at a later date in reliance on that earlier
conviction.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that “in the absence of any
other allegations of irregularities or claims of actual innocence
surrounding the prior convictions, [it] cannot preclude the use of [the
uncounseled] conviction in the absence of an actual constitutional
violation.” Id.
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NINTH CIRCUIT
Cal. Shock Trauma Air Rescue v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 636 F.3d 538
(9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a plaintiff who seeks declaratory relief, in
federal court, from a state regulation, on the ground that the state
regulation is preempted, presents a federal question. Id. at 543 .
ANALYSIS: The court first explained that the claim for declaratory
relief is based on a Supreme Court case permitting injunctive relief in
federal courts where federal statute had preempted state regulations.
However, the court distinguished the claim for declaratory relief from
Supreme Court precedent because the present case did not involve any
state officials. Id. at 543. The court stated that since there was no
proffered “case in which there exists federal subject matter jurisdiction
over a declaratory judgment claim brought by a private party against
another private party, [the] argument necessarily fails.” Id. The court
further explained that Supreme Court precedent “held that Declaratory
Judgment Act actions are procedural claims as opposed to substantive
ones that would confer jurisdiction.” Id. at 543–44
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a plaintiff is not entitled to
declaratory relief in federal courts based on the preemption of state
regulations because declaratory judgment is procedural, rather than
substantive. Id. at 544.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Mortg. Guar. Ins. Corp., 642 F.3d
849 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a district court’s discretion under the
[Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA)] allows the court to decline to consider
and to award relief under the [Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)].” Id. at
852.
ANALYSIS: The court first affirmed that a district court has “the
ability [under the DJA] to ‘accept’ or ‘decline’ ‘discretionary’
jurisdiction, or to decide whether to ‘exercise jurisdiction,’ in an action
seeking declaratory relief.” Id. The court further stated that, unlike the
DJA, “the FAA gives the adjudicating court no discretion as to whether
to award relief.” Id. at 854. Instead the FAA “mandates that district
courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to
which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). Lastly, the court noted that the “express terms of the [FAA] do
not allow a district court to abstain from granting relief in cases where its
jurisdiction is proper.” Id.
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the mandatory terms of the
FAA “require a federal court to decide an FAA motion that is properly
brought before [the court].” Id. at 856.
Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION ONE: Whether “applying the one-year filing deadline to
[an] asylum application violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . .” Id. at
335.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(2)(B) “requires that an alien
file an asylum application within one year of arrival in the United
States.” Id. at 336. The court reasoned that in order “[t]o establish an
equal protection violation, [plaintiff] must show that she is being treated
differently from similarly situated individuals.” Id. The court next
explained that because this case “does not allege discrimination on the
basis of a suspect class, any differential treatment violates equal
protection only if it lacks a rational basis.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted). The court stated that the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to
negate every conceivable basis which might support a legislative
classification . . . whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.”
Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted). The court determined that
“there is a legitimate government purpose for the one-year deadline . . .”
Id. at 337.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “the government’s
treatment of [plaintiff] is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose,” and that applying a one-year filing deadline to an asylum claim
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 337 (internal
quotations omitted).
QUESTION TWO: Whether “domestic abuse that occurs in the
United States can constitute past persecution,” where the United States is
not the proposed country of removal. Id. at 335.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the INA regulation in
question, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i), “provide[s] that past persecution
must have occurred in the proposed country of removal.” Id. at 337
(internal quotations omitted). The court then analyzed the regulation
under the Chevron doctrine and considered “whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the statute is unclear,
we ask whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. (internal citations and quotations
omitted). The court next determined that the statute did not “speak to the
issue” at bar, and proceeded to the second step of the analysis. Id. at
338. The court stated that “[t]he regulation mandating that past
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persecution occur in the proposed country of removal is a permissible
construction of the statute” and “[i]t is reasonable to link the past
persecution provision to the proposed country of removal.” Id. The
court further stated that “there is no logical nexus between persecution in
the United States . . . and risk of persecution in the country of removal.”
Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the INA regulation is “a
valid construction of the statute and past persecution must have occurred
in the proposed country of removal.” Id. at 338.
Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817 (9th
Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “[Whether] a treating physician is transformed into an
expert offering testimony on matter beyond the treatment rendered, for
purposes of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 26 disclosures . . . .” Id. at 824.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that doctors are generally exempt
from the written report requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B), to the court as
the doctor’s role is that of a “percipient witness of the treatment,” not as
an expert retained for one party’s benefit. Id. at 824. The court then
explained that treating physicians are not categorically exempt from the
written report requirement, as that would circumvent the policies of Rule
26. The court then sided with the 6th and 7th Circuits, which have
required parties to disclose a treating physician’s written report in
absence of some evidence that the physician formed his opinion during
the course of treatment. Id. at 825.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a doctor who testifies at
trial is “only exempt from Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s written report requirement
to the extent that his opinions were formed during the course of
treatment.” Id. at 826.
Haney v. Adams, 641 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “the state court’s decision to deny a [habeas
corpus petition on a] Batson claim when a defendant made no
contemporaneous objection to the use of peremptory challenges in the
trial court is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law.” Id. at 1171.
ANALYSIS: The court analyzed whether the state court’s habeas
corpus denial was an “unreasonable application” of law clearly
established in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S 79 (1986). Id. First, the
court looked at the Batson elements for alleging the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges: membership in a cognizable racial group, the
prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to remove the members of

2011]

First Impressions

119

that racial group, and that these and any other relevant facts raise an
inference of intentional discrimination. Id. at 1172. Second, the court
examined the Supreme Court’s remedies for Batson violations: seating
the wrongfully struck jurors or discharging the venire and selecting a
new jury. Id. The court found the elements and remedies presupposed a
timely objection during trial. and added that it would be unwise and
prejudicial to the prosecution to allow defendants to bring postconviction Batson claims. Id. at 1172–73.
CONCLUSION: The Ninth Circuit held that “a timely objection to
the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges is a prerequisite to a
Batson challenge.” Id. at 1173.
Hinds Invs. L.P. v. Angioli, 654 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: What acts of contribution are sufficient to trigger
liability under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C.S. § 6972(a)(1)(B)? Id. at 848.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the RCRA holds liable any person
who has “contributed or who is contributing” to the handling, storage,
treatment, transportation[,] or disposal of hazardous waste,” but does not
itself define what acts of contribution are sufficient to trigger liability.
Id. at 850. However, the court explained that the language Congress
used in drafting the statutory prohibition speaks only of active functions
with a direct connection to the waste itself. Id. at 851. Therefore, the
court posited that Congress was only concerned with those who played
an active role in handling, storing, transporting, or disposing of
hazardous waste, and not people such as manufactures of machines that
might generate a waste byproduct. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “to state a claim predicated
on RCRA liability for contributing to the disposal of hazardous waste, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant had a measure of control over the
waste at the time of its disposal or was otherwise actively involved in the
waste disposal process.” Id. at 852.
In Re Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 642 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempts
state regulation of foreign air carriers. Id. at 689.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “Congress’s occasional use of
the term “air carrier” to include “foreign air carrier” counsels strongly
that the meaning of “air carrier” is ambiguous in the ADA’s statutory
preemption provision.” Id. at 692. The court analyzed the context of the
provision to ascertain whether Congress intended that term to apply to
foreign air carriers. Id. at 693. The court concluded the statutory subpart

120

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 8:93

was regulating “both domestic and foreign air carriers, [and] a sensible
reading of the preemption provision implies that ‘air carrier’ was
intended to have its broader and ordinary meaning in this section of the
statute.” Id. at 693. The court further reasoned that the legislative
purpose of insuring a “uniform system of regulation” would be
undermined if the preemption provision were to be applied to domestic
airlines only. Id. at 694. Analyzing the legislative history of the
provision, the court noted that deletion of the limiting term “interstate” to
extend preemption to “any air carriers having authority . . . to provide air
transportation” suggested that “Congress intended to expand the ADA’s
preemptive scope to cover state regulation of” foreign air carriers as well.
Id. at 694–95. Finally, the Court explained that allowing states to
regulate only foreign air carriers would make it more challenging for the
foreign carriers to enter the American market, which in turn would be
detrimental to U.S. consumers and would be “contrary to U.S. treaty
obligations mandating nondiscrimination.” Id. at 696.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the “[ADA] preempts state
regulation of foreign air carriers.” Id. at 689.
Islamic Shura Council of S. Cal. v. FBI, 635 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a district court may open a sealed order for
the purpose of disclosing to plaintiffs, or just to counsel, unclassified
materials withheld under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Id. at
1169.
ANALYSIS: First, the 9th Circuit noted that FOIA permits the
government to withhold many types of documents from plaintiffs,
including unclassified materials, as long as they fall within one of
FOIA’s exceptions or exclusions. Id. at 1167–68. Second, the 9th
Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit in finding disclosure of withheld
materials would “adversely affect national security interests . . .
[because] it would color public perception of the security of confidential
information in government files . . . .” Id. at 1168. The court added that
disclosure of such information only to counsel would also strain the
attorney-client relationship. Id. Finally, the court noted that FOIA
permits the lower courts to conduct ex parte, in camera examinations of
all documents to protect against unlawful withholding. Id. at 1168–69.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that due process does not
require the disclosure of all unclassified materials, and a district court
may not disclose to counsel a sealed order when it contains information
that is rightfully withheld under the FOIA. Id.
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Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. Sebelius, 649 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION ONE: Whether the procedural requirement, imposed by
the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (“PRRB”) on Medicare
providers who appeal a Notice of Provider Reimbursement (“NPR”), to
provide position papers when appealing “is reasonable and necessary to
the efficient administration of the provider appeals process.” Id. at 1158.
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that the 4th, 6th, and 10th
Circuits, “have held that the procedural requirement of two position
papers is reasonable and necessary to the efficient administration of the
provider appeals process.” Id. The court agreed with the reasoning of
these cases because “[t]he position paper requirements assist in
narrowing the issues on appeal . . . and efficiently managing the
[PRRB’s] caseload” and “allow the [PRRB] to ignore late or improperly
presented claims.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
noted that the procedural requirements should be analyzed the same for
both final and preliminary position papers. Id. The court concluded that
“a provider’s statutory right to a hearing is not unduly burdened by a rule
allowing dismissal for failure to file a timely position paper.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the PRRB’s procedural
requirement for Medicare providers to provide position papers when
appealing their NPR is “reasonable and necessary to the administration
of the [PRRB’s] substantial caseload.” Id.
QUESTION TWO: Whether a PRRB decision to dismiss a Medicare
provider’s appeal of an NPR for failure to timely submit a position paper
constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. at 1159.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that the 4th and 10th Circuits and the
District Court for the District of Columbia have held that the PRRB’s
“decision to dismiss an appeal for failure to timely submit a position
paper does not constitute arbitrary and capricious conduct.” Id. The
court affirmed its application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review, by discussing “whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
reasoned that the PRRB did not abuse its discretion because Medicare
providers are provided with sufficient instructions and are “forewarned
that failure to file the position paper will result in dismissal of the
appeal.” Id. at 1160.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the PRRB’s “dismissal of
[a Medicare provider’s] appeal for failure to file a preliminary position
paper as required by the [PRRB’s] procedural rules” does not constitute
arbitrary or capricious conduct. Id. at 1160–61.
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L.A. Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the hospice cap regulation, 42 C.F.R.
§418.309(b)(l) conflicts with the hospice cap statute, 42 U.S.C. §
1395f(i)(2)(C), and is facially invalid. Id. at 660.
ANALYSIS: To resolve the question of whether 42 U.S.C. §
1395f(i)(2)(C) was facially invalid, the 9th Circuit used the Chevron test.
Id. at 660. Under the first Chevron prong, the court had to determine
whether Congress spoke to the precise question at hand, in which case
deference to the agency is inappropriate. Id. The court noted that the
hospice cap statute plainly states that, to determine the number of
Medicare beneficiaries, there must be a count of every individual who
received care reduced by the proportion of hospice care each individual
was provided in a previous year. Id. The court stated that the hospice
cap regulation, however, requires an individual patient to be counted as a
beneficiary in a single year, regardless of how much care the patient
received that year or whether the patient received the bulk of care in a
previous year. Id. The court then addressed the second Chevron step,
which requires deference to the agency interpretation of ambiguous
language, so long as it is reasonable. Id. The court noted, however, that
the terms of the statute were not ambiguous or imprecise. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the hospice cap regulation
was inconsistent with the statute and is facially invalid. Id. at 661.
Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether evidence of detrimental reliance is required
“to support an award of actual damages resulting from violations of the
Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA).” Id. at 882.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that a debtor’s lack of detrimental
reliance is immaterial to a determination of whether a creditor’s
violations of the FCBA resulted in actual damages. Id. at 887. The court
reasoned that requiring “evidence of detrimental reliance on an unmade
explanation would necessarily bar recovery of actual damages because
such evidence could never exist.” Id. at 887–88. Such a requirement
would contradict the purpose of the FCBA by allowing creditors to
“avoid actual damages under the FCBA by never responding to billing
disputes—the exact conduct the statute aims to prevent.” Id. at 888.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “evidence of detrimental
reliance is not required to support an award of actual damages resulting
from violations of [the FCBA].” Id.
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Pac. Indem. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 642 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the provision of the Carmack Amendment
that sets an amount for the replacement value of household goods also
limits the replacement value of household goods of undeclared value. Id.
at 708.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Carmack Amendment of the
Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) expressly subjects “replacement value”
to a formula by the Surface Transportation Board (“the Board”) and on
applicable tariff rates. Id. The court also noted that Congress has
delegated broad authority to the Board for the enforcement of the ICA.
Id. 708–09. The court held that when the Carmack Amendment is
ambiguous and the Board’s rule provides a permissible construction of
the statute, the court must defer to the Board’s rule. Id. at 709. After
finding the Carmack Amendment ambiguous, the court determined that
the Board’s rule limiting replacement value was a permissible
interpretation of the Amendment because subsection (f) of the Carmack
Amendment is entitled “Limiting liability of household goods carriers”
and because the board had approved the limiting tariff rate after full
notice and comment rulemaking. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held the “replacement value” of
household goods of undeclared value is subject to the limitations that the
Carmack Amendment sets forth. Id. at 710.
Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a district court may exercise subject matter
jurisdiction to review individualized residential drug abuse program
(RDAP) determinations of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Id. at 1225.
ANALYSIS: As an initial matter, the court noted that “[t]he
[Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] provides a cause of action for
persons suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, but withdraws that cause of action to the extent that the relevant
statute preclude[s] judicial review or the agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law.” Id. at 1226 (citation and internal quotations
omitted). The court then noted that in determining whether or not the
statute precludes judicial review the court looks to “express language, . . .
structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history,
and the nature of the administrative action involved.” Id. Analyzing the
plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3625, the court found that the “statute
specifies that the judicial review provisions of the APA . . . do not apply
to ‘any determination, decision, or order’ made pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3621–3624.” Id. at 1227. Rejecting petitioner’s contention that “the
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BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program . . . provides a vehicle for
aggrieved inmates to challenge . . . discretionary BOP determinations[,]”
the court found that “a habeas claim cannot be sustained solely upon the
BOP’s purported violation of its own program statement because
noncompliance with a BOP program statement is not a violation of
federal law.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “federal courts lack
jurisdiction to review the BOP’s individualized RDAP determinations
made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621[.]” Id. at 1228.
Simonoff v. Expedia, Inc., 643 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether, under the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACTA), an “‘electronically printed’ receipt includes
an email receipt [with the credit card’s expiration date] displayed on a
computer screen.” Id. at 1207.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that FACTA, which applies only to
electronically printed receipts, “prohibits merchants from printing credit
card expiration dates . . . on ‘electronically printed receipts.’” Id. The
9th Circuit first looked to dictionary definitions of the word “print,”
which the court summarized as “a physical imprint onto paper or another
tangible medium.” Id. at 1208. The court then examined the physical
position of the word “electronically,” in relation to the word “print,”
determining that “electronically” did not alter the definition of “print,”
but rather served to differentiate “receipts printed with electronic devices
from receipts printed by hand or by manual imprint.” Id. The court went
on to note that FACTA’s staggered implementation provision applies
only to devices that print physical receipts, “exclude[ing] machines that
do no more than electronically display information.” Id. at 1209.
Finally, the court pointed out that FACTA’s limited applicability to
devices that generate receipts at the point of sale “furnishes additional
evidence that a printed receipt is one given to the customer in a tangible
form.” Id. at 1210.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “‘electronically printed’
receipts include only receipts impressed onto a tangible medium by
electronic devices at the point of sale or transaction, not receipts that are
electronically transmitted to an email account or displayed on a computer
screen” Id.
Soriano-Vino v. Holder, 653 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the confidentiality provisions of the Special
Agricultural Workers program (SAW) are contravened when information
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is obtained as a result of questioning at an inspection checkpoint. Id. at
1099.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit began by looking to statutory language
to determine Congressional intent regarding the scope of confidentiality
provisions. Id. at 1100–01. The court found “that Congress was as
concerned with fraud in the application process as it was with shielding
applicants from unauthorized disclosure of the SAW application
contents.” Id. at 1101. The court also noted that “[b]y its plain terms,
the confidentiality provision applies expressly and exclusively to the
application itself.” Id. The court further reasoned that “[a]pplying the
confidentially provision to information that was not obtained from the
application would violate a cardinal principle of statutory
interpretation—that a statute be analyzed and applied in accordance with
its plain language.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that there was no violation of
the SAW confidentiality provisions when the challenged information was
obtained as the result of questioning at an inspection checkpoint rather
than from the application itself.” Id.
United States v. Bibbins, 637 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the “resisting” offense of 36 C.F.R.
§ 2.32(a)(1) contains a mens rea element of willfulness. Id. at 1090–91.
ANALYSIS: The court considered the plain meaning of the word
“resisting” and concluded that a person “cannot ‘resist’ someone or
something without forming an intention to do so.” Id. The court then
noted that strict liability is “strong medicine” which has led it, on several
other occasions, to read an intent element into other regulations. Id. at
1092. Finally, the court observed the Model Penal Code requires
purposefulness in two misdemeanors that are similar to the “resisting”
offense of 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1). Id. The court concluded the word
“resisting” legally connotes an element of willfulness. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a mens rea of willfulness is
a required element of the “resisting” violation of § 2.32(a)(1). Id.
United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “the search of a laptop computer that begins
at the border and ends days later at a far removed government facility
still falls under the border search doctrine.” Id. at 1070.
ANALYSIS: The court first defined the issue as “whether the
inherent power of the Government to subject incoming travelers to
inspection before entry also permits the Government to transport
property not yet cleared for entry away from the border to complete its
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search.” Id. at 1076. The court stated that “the border search doctrine
applies to searches and seizures that occur hundreds or thousands of
miles from the physical border.” Id. The court noted that “the border
search doctrine is guided—like all Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—
by reason and practicality, not inflexible rules of time and space.” Id.
The court went on to explain that time and space are relevant only “to the
extent that that they inform us whether an individual would reasonably
expect to be stopped and searched at a geographic point beyond the
international border.” Id. at 1076–77. The court cited Supreme Court
case law recognizing that a “thorough search of property under the
border search power does not implicate an individual’s privacy
expectation . . . .” Id. at 1078. The court also relied on its prior cases
regarding the transportation of complex property, specifically computer
equipment, to “a secondary site in order to adequately conduct a
meaningful search.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “[s]o long as property has
not been officially cleared for entry into the United States and remains in
the control of the Government, any further search is simply a
continuation of the original border search—the entirety of which is
justified by the Government’s border search power.” Id. at 1079.
United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION ONE: Whether, under California law, “child support
arrearages belong to a criminal defendant such that they may be assigned
to a victim by a restitution order while the defendant’s children are still
minors.” Id. at 1163.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that, “[a]s a general rule, a parent’s
obligation to pay child support runs to the child, rather than to the other
parent, and the parent, to whom such support is paid, is but a mere
conduit for the disbursement of that support.” Id. at 1179 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court noted that in certain circumstances,
the right of reimbursement may be assigned, but not while the children
are minors. Id. The court added that these child support arrearages
could not be assigned to a victim of a crime solely for the term of the
defendant-parent’s incarceration because of the troubling implications of
denying support to children who will still need to be provided for. Id. at
1181.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “that under California law, a
creditor (in this case a crime victim with a restitution order) is not
entitled to accrued child support payments owed to a custodial parent of
children who have not yet reached the age of majority.” Id. at 1180.
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QUESTION TWO: “What it means to commit a crime ‘in
connection with’ forced labor” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual pertaining to “Peonage, Involuntary Servitude, Slave Trade, and
Child Soldiers.” Id. at 1177.
ANALYSIS: The court observed that, “the commentary in this
section does not define the term and no court has interpreted the
language of this enhancement.” Id. The court then noted that there was
an analogous provision in the Manual relating to unlawful possession of
a firearm with commentary using the phrase “in connection with” to
mean “the potential of facilitating, another felony offense or another
offense.” Id. at 1177–78. The court then reasoned that, “[c]learly, the
drafters must be held to define terms consistently throughout the
Guidelines. Thus ‘in connection with’ must mean facilitation.” Id. at
1178.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “[i]n the forced labor context, a
felony is committed ‘in connection with’ forced labor where that crime
facilitates or has the potential of facilitating forced labor—or conversely
where forced labor facilitates or has the potential of facilitating another
felony offense.” Id. at 1177–78.
United States v. Evanston, 651 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a district court may, over defense objection
and after the administration of an unsuccessful Allen charge, inquire into
the reasons for a trial jury’s deadlock and then permit supplemental
argument focused on those issues, where the issues in dispute are factual
rather than legal.” Id. at 1082.
ANALYSIS: The court first established that an Allen charge “is a
supplemental instruction given by the court to reach a verdict after that
jury has been unable to agree after some period of deliberation.” Id. at
1082. The court noted that courts generally enjoy great discretion in
regulating jury deliberations, but the court’s exercise of discretion in
managing deliberations is not without limits. Id. at 1084. The court
illustrated one such limit, that much caution must be taken not to
influence or coerce the jury when intervening to stop a jury deadlock.
Id. at 1084–85. The court noted that by allowing additional argument to
supplement a particular issue, courts may be wrongfully highlighting a
particular issue, thus overshadowing other issues in the case. Id. at
1086–87. By allowing this type of inquiry, the court noted it may be
sanctioning an injustice. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit concluded “that allowing such a
procedure in a criminal trial is an abuse of the discretion accorded district
courts in the management of jury deliberations.” Id. at 1082.
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United States v. Harrell, 637 F.3d 1008 (9thCir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “the ‘relating to’ parentheticals within [the
Aggravated Identity Theft Statute,] 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c) limit the
statute’s otherwise clear articulation of which offenses may serve as
predicates for application of § 1028A(a).” Id. at 1009.
ANALYSIS: The court’s analysis focused on the language of the
statute, considering “not only the words used in a particular section but
also the statute as a whole.” Id. at 1010. The court opined that the plain
meaning of the phrase “‘relating to’ does not itself imply exclusivity;
rather it plainly reflects a descriptive character.” Id. at 1010–11.
Moreover, to accord the parenthetical a limiting effect would make other
provisions of the statute superfluous. Id. at 1011. The court further
observed that, when Congress intends a limiting clause it uses clear and
distinct language such as that provided in § 1028A(c)(4). Id. Lastly, the
court remarked that other circuits have widely understood Congress’ use
of “relating to” parentheticals to have a descriptive import. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “the plain text of
§ 1028A(c) demonstrates that the ‘relating to’ parentheticals serve as
descriptive aids intended by Congress to make reading the statute
easier[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
United States v. Sanchez, 639 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether an individual under a “no contact” court order
that does not explicitly prohibit “physical force, abuse or harm” commits
an unlawful act under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) by possessing a firearm. Id.
at 1202–05.
ANALYSIS: The court first observed that “[t]he [1st, 4th, and 11th
Circuits] have reached a consensus: [subsection] 8(C)(ii) is satisfied by a
court order that includes explicit terms, similar—if not identical—in
meaning to ‘the use of physical force that would be reasonably expected
to cause bodily injury.’” Id. at 1204 (internal citations omitted). The
court then noted that no court “has found that a court order barring ‘no
contact’—but containing no explicit prohibitions on physical force,
abuse or harm—satisfies 8(C)(ii).” Id. at 1205. The court stated that the
statutory language required “explicit” reference to these prohibitions and
that the term “explicit” should be given its plain meaning. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “while a conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) does not require that the precise language of
[subsection] (8)(C)(ii) be contained in a court order, a court order must
contain explicit terms substantially similar in meaning to the language of
(8)(C)(ii)” for a defendant to be guilty of violating a “no contact” court
order for possession of a firearm. Id. at 1205.
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Van Dusen v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz., 654 F.3d
838 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a district court may rule on the applicability
of an arbitration provision to a § 1 exemption to the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), or whether it must instead delegate that threshold question to
an arbitrator. Id. at 843.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “[the] question of arbitrability
is an issue for judicial determination [unless] the parties clearly and
unmistakably provide otherwise.” Id. The court noted that, though a
district court may compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA, § 1
“explicitly carves out a category of cases exempt from the provisions of
the Act.” Id. at 843–44. The court further noted that “a district court has
no authority to compel arbitration under § 4 where § 1 exempts the
underlying contract from the FAA’s provisions.” Id. The court reasoned
that “whatever the contracting parties may or may not have agreed upon
is a distinct inquiry from whether the FAA confers authority on the
district court to compel arbitration.” Id. at 844.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “the best reading of the
law requires the district court to assess whether a § 1 exemption [of the
FAA] applies before ordering arbitration.” Id. at 846.
TENTH CIRCUIT
Countryman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 639 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s failure to attach a codefendant’s summons to a joint notice of removal constitutes a de
minimis procedural defect that would necessitate remand of the case to
state court. Id. at 1272.
ANALYSIS: The court observed that a minority of district courts
within the circuit have held a “removing party’s failure to attach the
required state court papers to a notice of removal is a fatal defect that
necessitates remand.” Id. The court also noted a majority view among
district courts have held a “removing party’s failure to attach the required
state court papers to a notice of removal is a mere procedural defect that
is curable.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit agreed, without discussion, with
the majority view in holding that the “omission of a summons from a
defendant’s joint notice of removal was an inadvertent, minor procedural
defect that was curable, either before or after expiration of the thirty day
removal period.” Id. at 1273.
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Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “donning and doffing poultry processing
workers’ personal protective equipment is ‘changing clothes,’” under 29
U.S.C. § 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Id. at 1133
(internal quotations omitted).
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the meaning of the phrase
“changing clothes” is ambiguous, explaining, “[a]s evidenced by the
differing interpretations of several courts and the United States
Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division . . . , the word ‘clothing’
is susceptible of multiple meanings, particularly in the industrial labor
context where specialized apparel and equipment is often worn.” Id. at
1137. The court held that the “donning and doffing” provision of the
FLSA was not an “exemption” within the Act and thus was not required
to be read narrowly or construed in favor of the plaintiff by operation of
law. Id. at 1138. The court reasoned that Congress employed language
to be used in its ordinary meaning. Id. at 1139. The court went on to
hold that “[a]n expansive construction is consistent with the ordinary
meaning of the word ‘clothes,’ and makes more sense than a construction
that would differentiate between apparel and equipment designed for
safety purposes and other apparel and equipment, or between non-unique
and unique apparel and equipment.” Id. at 1138–39.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that “donning and doffing the
[personal protective equipment] at issue” is considered changing clothes.
Id. at 1136.
United States v. Acosta-Gallardo, 656 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether venue is proper for a charge of using the
telephone to facilitate a drug conspiracy, where alleged telephone calls
were neither placed nor received in the venue district.. Id. at 1119.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) does not
contain a specific venue provision. Id. The court then analogized this
offense to venue questions of firearm offenses that were ancillary to
kidnapping charges that cross state lines, even if the firearm offense was
not “committed” in the venue state. Id. at 1120. Based on this
precedent, the court reasoned that the defendant must be complicit in an
underlying drug felony, and found that venue for a “violation committed
in furtherance of a conspiracy would be proper in any district where the
communication facility was used or the underlying conspiracy was
committed.” Id. at 1122.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that venue may be proper for
the inchoate crime of conspiracy when a phone call that was placed and
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received in a different venue and “touched” the present venue facilitated
that conspiracy. Id. at 1119.
United States v. Langford, 641 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “[W]hether there is federal jurisdiction for a victimless
crime, perpetrated by a non-Indian in Indian country.” Id. at 1197.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that, pursuant to a long line of
Supreme Court cases, “federal jurisdiction over crimes in Indian country
is contingent upon the existence of either an Indian victim or
perpetrator.” Id. Despite the plain language of several criminal statutes
that granted federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court “created an
exception premised upon the sovereign equality of the individual states.”
Id. at 1198. The court noted that the Supreme Court has suggested in
dicta that the same principle applies to victimless crimes by non-Indians
in Indian country. Id. at 1199.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that there is no federal
jurisdiction and that “states possess exclusive criminal jurisdiction over
crimes occurring in Indian country if there is neither an Indian victim,
nor an Indian perpetrator.” Id. at 1197.
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(a) of the Copyright Act, applies to works manufactured outside of
the United States. Id. at 214.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the district courts within the
11th Circuit have determined that § 109(a) does not apply to foreignmanufactured goods imported into the United States. Id. at 212 (internal
citations omitted). The 9th Circuit previously held that “§109(a) does
not apply to items manufactured outside the United States unless they
were previously imported and sold in the United States with the
copyright holder’s permission.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The
court also noted that the Supreme Court held that 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), in
conjunction with 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) limits the scope of 17 U.S.C.
§ 602(a). Id. at 217 (internal citation omitted). The court then
determined that the text of § 109(a) was too ambiguous to rely on a
textual analysis. Id. at 220. Interpreting § 109(a) to apply to works
manufactured outside of the United States, however, would render § 602
useless in most cases. Id. at 221. On the other hand, interpreting § 109
to not apply to works manufactured outside of the United States would
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allow copyright holders to control the circumstances in which copies
manufactured abroad could be legally imported into the United States. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the first sale doctrine,
codified by § 109(a), did not apply when all of the books in question
were manufactured outside of the United States. Id. at 222.
United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a district court is required to correct a pro se
defendant who chooses not to testify because the defendant is not aware
that he is able to testify in narrative form. Id. at 1313.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that a “pro se criminal defendant
may to testify in narrative form,” id. at 1312, and that the right to choose
is personal, as well as fundamental, and the defendant must make this
decision himself.” Id. at 1315–16. Additionally, the court noted that,
“[l]ike other fundamental trial rights, the right to testify is truly protected
only when the defendant makes his decision knowingly and
intelligently.” Id. A pro se defendant, the court stated, foregoes the
benefit of an attorney who could advise him and provide necessary
information to make a knowing and intelligent decision about whether or
not to testify. Id. at 1314. Thus, the court reasoned that a pro se
defendant also foregoes a remedy under the ineffective assistance of
counsel paradigm. Id. Therefore, the court decided that “a district court
can—and sometimes must—aid an ignorant pro se defendant.” Id. at
1316. The court stated that this does not mean that “district courts must
engage in a colloquy with every pro se defendant regarding his decision
whether to testify,” but, a district court may not begin the colloquy and
subsequently reinforce the defendant’s misunderstanding of the choice to
testify. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that absent evidence to the
contrary, district courts should presume that the defendant, even a pro se
defendant, has made a knowing and intelligent decision about whether to
testify. Id. at 1317. However, where a district court has knowledge that
a defendant has not exercised his right to decide whether to testify
knowingly and intelligently because of a misunderstanding, the district
court is required to correct defendant’s misunderstanding. Id. at 1316.
United States v. Willis, 649 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “Whether harmless error applies to a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 3552(d)[:]” granting a defendant ten days to review a presentence investigation report (PSR). Id. at 1257.
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “[the] purpose of the ten-day
requirement is to ensure accuracy and fairness in sentencing by allowing
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the defendant adequate time to review and verify the information
contained in the PSR prior to sentencing.” Id. at 1256–57 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court then noted that “at least two other
courts of appeals have applied harmless error to untimely disclosure of a
PSR,” in holding that a probation officer’s delinquency in filing an
amended presentence report did not significantly affect the defendant’s
right to a fair sentencing hearing. Id. at 1257. The court further
reasoned that “federal statutes and criminal-procedure rules lay a
background assumption of harmless-error analysis.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “§ 3552(d) is susceptible
to harmless-error analysis.” Id.
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus.
& Serv. Workers Int’l Union AFL-CIO-CLC Local 320 v. Wise Alloys,
LLC, 642 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “a party adversely affected by an arbitration
award in § 301 [of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)]
arbitration cases must challenge the award by judicial action within the
statute of limitations or else be barred from raising any defenses to the
award.” Id. at 1352.
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit previously reasoned that “statutes of
limitations apply to defenses as well as suits because arbitration awards
are themselves the creations of statutes, not common law.” Id. The 11th
Circuit agreed with the 7th Circuit and reasoned that where a right of
action which did not exist by the common law is provided by statute, the
statute fixes the time period in which the right may be enforced and “the
time so fixed becomes a limitation” on that right. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a party in a § 301
arbitration case who is adversely affected “must challenge the award by
judicial action within the statute of limitations or else be barred from
raising any defense to the award.” Id.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
In re BP Lubricants USA Inc., 637 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the particularity requirement of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b) applies to false marking claims under 35 U.S.C. § 292. Id. at
1310.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to
plead “with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake.” Id. The court added that Rule 9(b) serves as a safety valve by
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assuring that only viable claims of fraud and mistake proceed to
discovery and preventing the use of discovery as a fishing expedition.
Id. The court pointed to an analogous statute, the False Claims Act
(FCA), in which the plaintiff must also meet the requirements of Rule
9(b), because the FCA “condemns fraud, ‘but not negligent errors or
omissions.’” Id. The court noted that, “like the [FCA], § 292 condemns
fraudulent or false marking,” and “Rule 9(b)’s gatekeeping function is
also necessary to assure that only viable claims reach discovery or
arbitration.” Id. at 1311.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement applies to false marking claims under § 292. Id. at 1311.
Smith v. Shinseki, 647 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the Veterans Administration (VA) “is
obligated to supply a vocational expert as a matter of course in cases
where the veteran cannot perform his old job” to determine whether the
veteran qualifies for total disability based on individual unemployability
(TDIU) status. Id. at 1383.
ANALYSIS: The court noted first that “[t]he explicit reference to
medical expert reports without a reference to vocational expert reports
provides evidence that Congress did not view such industrial surveys as
‘necessary.’” Id. at 1384. Also, the court examined the administrative
scheme of the VA and concluded that the “VA regulation governing
TDIU claims includes no requirement that the agency consider the
availability of work and makes no reference to vocational experts or
industrial surveys.” Id. Finally, in deferring to the Veteran Court’s
interpretation of the TDIU regulation, the court explained that since “a
TDIU determination does not require any analysis of the actual
opportunities available in the job market, [it] decline[d] to conclude that
an industrial survey is ‘necessary’ for that purpose in connection with
TDIU claims.” Id. at 1385.
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that the VA is not
obligated to supply a vocational expert in TDIU determinations. Id.
D.C. CIRCUIT
Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am., 644 F.3d 427 (D.C.
Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether, in an Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) benefits denial case, the court may consider
multiple presented documents in order to determine if a “[particular]
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benefit[s] plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary
authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of
the plan.” Id. at 433 (internal quotations omitted).
ANALYSIS: The District of Columbia Circuit first looked to the
language of the statute and stated that “ERISA’s statutory text suggests
that multiple plan documents can be legally relevant.” Id. The court
reasoned that ERISA also “clearly contemplates multiple relevant
documents” because it states that there are multiple documents that will
lay out the terms of the plan. Id. at 434. Finally, the court noted that
other circuits have “generally concluded that multiple plan documents
are legally relevant.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit determined that a court may
correctly consider multiple documents to determine whether the plan
gives an administrator or fiduciary the authority to determine benefits
eligibility. Id.

